The peace plan for Gaza promoted by the Trump administration since last September – and now endorsed by the UN – has created the space for a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. As these lines are written, despite repeated violations, this fragile truce has been in place for more than one month and represents a chance to put an end to a bloody war that lasted for two years and generated tens of thousands of victims as well as an ongoing humanitarian catastrophe. This is not the first ceasefire agreed upon by Israel and Hamas since October 2023. However, the September initiative stands out for the amount of political capital invested by the Trump administration in brokering the plan and working with allies and partners to make it move forward.
An analysis of how the plan was developed and the first steps in its implementation suggests that the Gaza ceasefire might be a way station toward a much broader reconfiguration of the geopolitics of the Middle East. On the other hand, the foundations of the Trump administration’s vision might turn out to be too shaky to sustain a new geopolitical equilibrium and favor progress towards the resolution of the Israel-Palestine question.
The Gaza Tragedy
The conflict that started with Hamas’s terrorist attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023, has brought the Holy Land into an abyss of violence and horror. According to estimates accepted by the UN, 68,875 Palestinians have lost their lives since October 7, 2023. This figure includes more than 20,000 children, more than 10,000 women, and almost 5,000 elderly people. According to figures recently provided by Hamas-controlled authorities in Gaza, the death toll of the war in Gaza has in fact exceeded 69,000. Over 1,200 people died as a result of Hamas’s October 7 terrorist attacks and 471 Israeli soldiers have lost their lives during military operations in Gaza. As these lines are written, the corpses of 7 Israeli hostages still remain in Gaza.
This bloodshed has failed to achieve any meaningful goal. On the one hand, Hamas’s horrifying attacks started a conflict that the terrorist group cannot win and made progress towards the creation of a Palestinian state much more difficult. On the other hand, the Israeli response has led to the death of thousands of innocent civilians and almost completely destroyed the Gaza Strip but failed to destroy Hamas or to discredit the radical ideology that drives the terrorist organization. Several now-defunct Hamas leaders received arrest warrants from the International Criminal Court. The Court also issued arrest warrants for war crimes and crimes against humanity against Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. In December 2023 the government of South Africa requested an International Court of Justice ruling on whether Israel’s response to the October 7 terrorist attacks violated obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
The Gaza War has also had major regional ramifications. Soon after Hamas’s terrorist attacks, other non-state actors that are part of the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance” launched attacks against Israel as well as other offensive operations aimed at inflicting casualties and economic pain on Israel and its allies. Hezbollah started launching missile strikes across the Lebanese border into northern Israel, while the Houthi in Yemen initiated a series of attacks in the Red Sea, with the goal of disrupting sea transport in the region. Israel’s response to these attacks has been forceful but often reckless. Between 2024 and 2025 the Israeli military carried out targeted killings in Syria, Iran, Yemen, and Lebanon. Israel also invaded southern Lebanon in order to eliminate the threat posed by Hezbollah, although operations led to a spike in tension with UNIFIL, the UN peacekeeping force deployed in the area. In 2024 Israel and Iran directly clashed several times and in June 2025 Israel launched a massive air campaign aimed at destroying Iran’s nuclear program and possibly overthrow the Tehran regime. Despite direct US military assistance, this “12-Day War” failed to achieve game-changing results.
American-Israeli Relations Since October 7: A Close but Difficult Partnership
American assistance, under the administrations led by Joe Biden and (since January 2025) Donald Trump, has been, for better and for worse, an essential factor in Israel’s response to the October 7 attacks. In spite of very different styles and rhetoric, both Biden and Trump have provided Israel with generous economic, political, and military support. Since October 2023, the US has guaranteed military aid to Israel for an amount of more than 21 billion dollars. Besides assisting Israel in the June war against Iran, the US led Operation Prosperity Guardian – a multinational military operation aimed at countering the Houthi threat in the Red Sea – and engaged in several additional military initiatives against members of the “Axis of Resistance.” American leaders also used US political influence at the UN and with Washington’s key partners to prevent Israel’s isolation on the international stage.
Despite this staunch support, American leaders have expressed open disagreements in relation to Israel’s response to the October 7 attacks, while both Biden and Trump have had a difficult personal relationship with Prime Minister Netanyahu. In December 2023, Lloyd Austin – Biden’s Defense Secretary – warned Israeli leaders about the moral and strategic importance of discriminating between terrorists and civilians. During the early phases of the crisis, US leaders resisted Israeli calls for an expansion of the conflict. As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump openly criticized Netanyahu for “losing the PR war,” and as President-elect, he strongly backed a ceasefire deal that entered into force in January 2025 – but collapsed in March as Israel resumed military operations against Hamas. Since his inauguration, Trump has taken several initiatives that conflict with the strategy supported by the Netanyahu government (and by many of Trump’s own advisers). In May, Trump agreed to a ceasefire with the Houthis and ended Operation Prosperity Guardian. The president has also cultivated relations with Syria’s new president Ahmed al-Sharaa and, despite assisting Israel during the “12-Day War,” has consistently expressed an interest in negotiating with Iran.
For both ideological reasons and domestic political considerations, Netanyahu has repeatedly challenged the American approach. This tension, however, reached a breaking point last September. On September 9, 2025, following a terrorist attack in Jerusalem in which Palestinian gunmen killed 6 people, Israel launched a major strike in Doha, Qatar. The goal was to kill Hamas leaders based in Qatar, but, besides failing to achieve the expected results, the strike crossed a red line and had several important repercussions on US policy.
Qatar is a close US ally that hosts America’s biggest military base in the Middle East. The presence of Hamas’s political leaders in Qatar was part of the country’s effort to provide a forum for negotiations between Israel and Hamas. Qatar and other Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf are key regional partners of the United States and last May pledged billions of dollars in arms deals and investments in the US. These countries have been lobbying for an end to the war in Gaza, progress toward the creation of a Palestinian State, and negotiations with Iran.
After Doha
On September 11, the Israeli attack was condemned by the UN Security Council, while on September 15 an emergency meeting of Arab and Muslim countries was held in Doha. A few days later, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a security deal that includes a mutual defense commitment. Trump immediately praised Qatar as a “strong ally and friend” and deplored the attack as an initiative that “does not advance Israel or America’s goals.” The White House, however, concluded that the potential geopolitical ramifications of this crisis required a much bolder American initiative. Hence, the US and regional partners initiated a coordinated effort to put pressure on Israel and Hamas to reach a new ceasefire. The Trump administration concentrated its efforts on Netanyahu and the Israeli government while Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt focused on Hamas.
On September 29, Netanyahu visited the United States and met President Donald Trump. This was Netanyahu’s fourth trip to the United States since Trump’s inauguration in January 2025. In a phone call brokered by Trump, Netanyahu expressed regret to the Qatari Prime Minister – Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani – for violating Qatar’s sovereignty in the context of Israel’s strikes in Doha. On the same day, Trump announced a new peace plan for Gaza. This new “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict” is a 20-point plan that aims at ending the war and finding a long-term solution to the Gaza conflict.
The most immediate goals of Trump’s plan include the end of hostilities, the return of Israeli and Palestinian hostages (or their remains), and the resumption of full aid to the Gaza Strip – which must be managed by the UN and the Red Crescent. The plan also features more long term commitments such as an amnesty for Hamas leaders who commit to peaceful coexistence and the creation of a new governance structure for Gaza in which Hamas won’t have any role. Such a new government must revolve around a temporary, technocratic Palestinian committee and a “Board of Peace” presided by Trump (former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair was also mentioned in the plan). The path to a settlement also includes a “Trump economic development plan” and the creation of a special economic zone. Contrary to a previous controversial idea to depopulate Gaza and turn it into a “Riviera”, the September plan specifies that no one will be forced to leave Gaza and that “Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza.”
The implementation of the plan will be guaranteed by “regional partners” and will be backed by a temporary International Stabilization Force for Gaza created by the US in coordination with Washington’s Arab partners. The settlement must be facilitated by an interfaith dialogue process and is supposed to provide “a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.”
On the same day, the Trump administration also issued an executive order aimed at assuring the security of Qatar through a mechanism that is very similar to NATO’s article 5. According to this new arrangement, the US
“shall regard any armed attack on the territory, sovereignty, or critical infrastructure of the State of Qatar as a threat to the peace and security of the United States. In the event of such an attack, the United States shall take all lawful and appropriate measures – including diplomatic, economic, and, if necessary, military – to defend the interests of the United States and of the State of Qatar and to restore peace and stability.”
It is interesting to note that, while NATO’s article 5 is part of an international treaty ratified by the US Senate, this Trump administration’s revised version of the “Carter Doctrine” has been undertaken by executive order.
Saudi Arabia has persistently sought a NATO-style US security guarantee, and in October it was reported that a Qatar-style arrangement was under negotiation. On November 18, 2025, Trump hosted Saudi Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman (also known as MBS) and the issue of a US-Saudi defense pact was discussed. Even if such an agreement does not materialize, it is possible that – just like Qatar – Saudi Arabia will obtain a guarantee via executive order. On the eve of MBS’s visit, Trump announced that the US will sell F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia. American leaders previously resisted Saudi requests to purchase this type of aircraft because of Israeli opposition and out of concerns about Saudi Arabia’s security partnership with China. During a meeting in the Oval Office, Trump also vaguely hinted at the possibility of a transfer of American nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia – another long standing Saudi request.
Trump’s “Comprehensive Plan” was met with positive reactions on the part of the governments of America’s closest allies and was endorsed by the UN Security Council on November 17, 2025. The ceasefire between Israel-Hamas entered into force on October 10. A few days later, on October 13, the exchange of the remaining Israeli hostages held by Hamas and Palestinians detained by Israel started. On the same day, the White House released a “Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity” in which the governments of the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey stated that they are “united in our determination to dismantle extremism and radicalization in all its forms” and that they “hereby commit to the resolution of future disputes through diplomatic engagement and negotiation rather than through force or protracted conflict.”
Beyond Phase One
The “Trump Declaration” of October 13 signals a step in the direction of the consolidation of a partnership between the Washington and three countries that have developed deep stakes in the Gaza conflict and whose leaders – especially Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah El-Sisi – enjoy a strong personal empathy with Donald Trump. Egypt appears indeed to be destined to be the leader of a 5,000-strong military contingent that should constitute the Gaza stabilization force. According to The Guardian, US leaders are hoping to obtain contributions from European partners – such as the UK, France, Germany, and the Nordic countries – as well as from Jordan, although the feasibility of this plan is still open to question. These forces should be deployed in a “Green Zone” in the eastern, northern, and southern parts of the Gaza Strip now under control of Israeli forces, while the western part will initially remain beyond the control of the stabilization force. Turkey also offered a substantial number of troops, but the prospect of a Turkish contribution has generated extreme opposition on the part of the Netanyahu government.
This tension over Turkey’s offer to contribute to the Gaza stabilization force points to the broader question of Israel’s place in this emerging pattern of US partnerships in the region. The Trump administration has been pushing very forcefully to ensure Israel’s participation in the “Comprehensive Plan.” Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff – Trump’s point men in the Middle East – even participated in the Israeli cabinet meeting that led to the decision to accept the ceasefire and are working in close contact with Netanyahu.
The Trump administration is also determined to revive the process initiated with the “Abraham Accords” of 2020 – an initiative that has allowed Israel to normalize relations with several Arab and Muslim countries. In early November, Trump announced that Kazakhstan will join the Abraham Accords. Kazakhstan, however, already has diplomatic relations with Israel. The real prize in this process would be a normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Government, however, has repeatedly stated that such a development is conditional to substantial progress towards Palestinian statehood.
Despite not openly opposing the Trump peace plan, Netanyahu has declared that his government still rejects the idea of a Palestinian state. As already mentioned, Israeli forces have carried out operations in the Gaza Strip even after the beginning of the ceasefire. Israel has also carried out attacks in Lebanon, despite a ceasefire that has been in force since November 2024. These attacks are intended to destroy Hezbollah military facilities but the operations are creating further tension with UNIFIL. The relationship between the US and Israel is further complicated by a significant decrease in American public opinion support for Israel. Increasing numbers of Americans are sympathetic to the Palestinians and think that the US should reduce its military support for Israel.
The future of Hamas also represents a major challenge in the effort to move beyond the ceasefire and advance towards a long-term solution to the Gaza conflict. Hamas seems prepared to relinquish political responsibilities over the Gaza Strip but does not want to be sidelined or disarmed. The group still has fighters and an operational structure in the Gaza Strip, and seems poised to end up in control of the “Red Zone” – the western areas of the Gaza Strip where the international stabilization force is not supposed to deploy during the first phases of the mission.
The Fragile Truce and the Future of the Middle East
The October 7 attacks and the two years of bloody fighting that followed Hamas’s brutal terrorist operation against Israel have clearly demonstrated that the precarious status quo that existed before October 2023 was unsustainable. The Middle East needs a new order in which Israel can live in peace with its neighbors and can exist alongside a democratic and sovereign Palestinian state. Trump’s “Comprehensive Plan” for Gaza acknowledges these imperatives much more explicitly than previous initiatives, while the October ceasefire provides a precious window of opportunity to end the bloodshed and restart the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.
US initiatives also suggest an intention to rethink America’s role in the region and facilitate progress towards a new, and possibly more stable, regional equilibrium. However, there is reason to be skeptical about the Trump administration’s determination to stay the course and develop a sustainable, long-term plan for Gaza and the Middle East. The Trump administration’s approach has been wavering and characterized by a tendency to react to events and improvise plans. Since January 2025, US policy has oscillated between calling for a “Gaza Riviera” without Gazans to working towards Palestinian self-determination; between pushing for a ceasefire and tolerating Israel’s breaches of the ceasefires; between negotiating with Iran and calling for regime change. Trump’s political style is highly personal, and sometimes partnerships that appear solid in the aftermath of international summits are not followed by long-term, structured frameworks of strategic cooperation. In some cases, Trump and his advisers’ transactional approach towards the geopolitics of the Middle East appears to have made them particularly responsive to material rewards and the prospect of personal gains.
For all its shortcomings, the fragile truce that has developed since October represents a rare opportunity to put an end to the conflict in Gaza, restart the Israel-Palestine peace process, and move towards a more stable and inclusive order in the Middle East. Progress along this path will require patience, perseverance, and good faith on the part of American leaders and their regional and international partners. When it comes to the Middle East, patience, perseverance, and good faith have been in rather short supply. As two years of war in Gaza tragically indicate, however, failing to seize this opportunity might entail unbearable human costs and precipitate the region in a new spiral of war and instability.
Diego Pagliarulo