On June 13, 2025, Israel launched Operation “Rising Lion” – a major attack against Iran. The goal of the military operation was to severely downgrade and possibly eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities, although Israel’s Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other members of his cabinet also expressed additional objectives, such as the overthrow of the Tehran regime. Targets included nuclear facilities such as Natanz as well as top Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists. Israel’s airstrikes also targeted urban areas such as Tehran. In the weeks before the attack, US intelligence sources had suggested that the Israeli government was preparing for a military operation against Iran’s nuclear facilities, although at the time it appeared that the final decision had not yet been made. In the days before the launch of the operation, the US had also moved thousands of missiles from Ukraine to the Middle East, and the price of oil had started rising – a sign of increasing tension in the region. Although all these signals appear clear in retrospect, the initial Israeli attack was a major operational success that required very extensive preparations – including the deployment of Israeli military assets on Iranian territory – and demonstrated Israel’s military and intelligence superiority over Iran.
Netanyahu has claimed that his government is acting in response to a “clear and present danger to Israel’s very survival.” Operation “Rising Lion”, however, is incompatible with the basic principles of international law. Article 2 of the UN Charter clearly establishes that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” Israel has been a member of the UN since May 1949, while Iran was one of the founding members of the organization in 1945. According to the principles endorsed by all members of the UN, the use of force is legitimate only in self-defense in response to an armed attack or if military action is explicitly authorized by the UN Security Council – and none of these conditions was present when the Netanyahu government launched the attack against Iran. Operation “Rising Lion” is also damaging Iran’s civilian infrastructures, generating a mass exodus from the country’s major urban centers such as the capital Tehran, and killing innocent Iranian civilians.
Israel caught Iran off guard at a moment when both the Tehran regime and its regional proxies – like the Lebanese Hezbollah – had been weakened by US and international sanctions as well as previous Israeli operations. The Tehran regime has nonetheless managed to retaliate by launching hundreds of long range and ballistic missiles as well as drones against Israel. Contrary to previous Iranian attacks, this time some of Tehran’s missiles and drones pierced through Israel’s air defenses, causing serious damage and innocent civilian victims in several urban centers, including Tel Aviv and Haifa. Despite the initial and continuing military effectiveness of Operation “Rising Lion”, the Netanyahu government’s decision to launch an attack on Iran is exacting a serious political and human cost for Israel – and obviously for Iran as well. It is thus critically important to properly assess the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program, the alternative options available to prevent Iran from building a nuclear arsenal, and the likely consequences of a military conflict between Israel and Iran.
Iran is a signatory of the Treaty on Nuclear non Proliferation (also known as NPT) and claims that its nuclear program is merely civilian – and thus legal under the provisions of the NPT. Until very recently, international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had found no evidence that Iran was breaching the NPT, although the consensus within the world intelligence community had been that Iran was clandestinely trying to develop a nuclear arsenal. This is why institutions such as the UN Security Council as well as great powers like the US and its allies imposed sanctions on the Tehran regime. It is important to acknowledge that Iran’s nuclear program, even if developed in compliance with the NPT, could still be perceived as a threat by Tehran’s neighbors. If Iran mastered every technological step required to build a civilian nuclear program – especially the enrichment of uranium, which can be used for both civilian and military purposes – the country would reach a “threshold” and could easily add a military component at a later date. Days before the Israeli operation, the IAEA had certified – for the first time in 20 years – that Iran was in breach of its nuclear nonproliferation obligations.
Scholars and policymakers have extensively debated the essence and magnitude of the threat represented by the Iranian nuclear program, but the issue is not settled, and different schools of thought can provide us with different and sometimes contrasting perspectives. According to an influential school of thought known as “realism,” countries seek to acquire a nuclear arsenal in order to deter an attack by a foreign power and guarantee their own survival. According to this paradigm, governments – democracies and dictatorships alike – are rational actors, and the only rational use of nuclear weapons is as a deterrent. The Tehran regime is trying to develop a nuclear arsenal in order to guarantee its own existence and deter an attack by the US, Israel, or other rivals. If a nuclear Iran – or any other nuclear power, for that matter – launched a nuclear attack against Israel or any of its neighbors, the retaliation by Israel, the US, or any other great power would be so massive that the action would be suicidal, hence not rational. A nuclear Iran, realists maintain, would not be an existential threat to a major nuclear superpower like the US or even a smaller one like Israel – which already has a nuclear arsenal, although its existence is not officially acknowledged. In fact, according to this school of thought, an Iranian atomic arsenal would be a stabilizing factor in the Middle East, since the risk of nuclear war would induce restraint on both Iran and Israel – just like the “balance of terror” and “Mutual Assured Destruction” (MAD) stabilized the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
The realist school has the merit of helping us assess the nature of the threat posed by a nuclear Iran and better appraise the bellicist and sensationalist rhetoric that dominates the headlines. Realists can also help us acknowledge that even brutal dictatorships like the Tehran regime have legitimate security concerns and respond to rational stimuli. However, the vast majority of scholars and policymakers agree that nuclear proliferation is a major concern and a nuclear-armed Iran would destabilize the already turbulent geopolitics of the Middle East. Leaders are not always rational and can miscalculate, while regimes can evolve or change and become more radical and aggressive. After all, the current Iranian regime has repeatedly vowed to destroy Israel and has actively supported militias and terrorist groups that are committed to the same goal. In addition, national security experts are particularly concerned that the development of a nuclear arsenal by Iran would trigger a wave of nuclear proliferation across the Middle East. The key question is how to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear arsenal, and the alternatives revolve around political negotiations or military action.
Another influential school of thought – “neoliberal institutionalism” – argues that the best way to achieve non-proliferation is through negotiations and the creation of a system of institutions and incentives to persuade the Tehran regime that it does not need a nuclear arsenal, while giving up the ambition to become a nuclear power is the best option to advance Iran’s national interest. This was the approach adopted by the administration of Barack Obama. Between 2013 and 2015, the Obama administration engaged in a delicate and difficult series of negotiations that eventually culminated in July 2015 with the signature of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – also known as JCPOA or simply as the “Iran nuclear deal.” The agreement was signed by the US, Iran, the UK, France, Germany, Russia, and China – and the EU was also involved in the process. In a nutshell, the JCPOA created an international regime by which Iran would allow inspections of its nuclear facilities and commit to acquire enriched uranium from foreign suppliers. In return, the US and other powers would gradually lift economic sanctions on Iran. The deal was not a grand bargain and left a number of other major security concerns – such as the Iranian ballistic missile program and the Tehran regime’s support for militias in the Middle East – unresolved. However, the JCPOA worked and, according to experts, guaranteed that Iran would not develop a nuclear bomb for at least 10 to 15 years.
The JCPOA faced strong opposition from the Israeli government – that at the time, just like now, was led by Benjamin Netanyahu – as well as Republicans in Congress but remained in force until 2018, and delivered the expected results. In the event, however, the first Trump administration decided to withdraw from the deal, despite evidence that Iran was abiding by it, and opted instead renewing sanctions and instituting a policy of “maximum pressure” against the Tehran regime. This decision turned out to be counterproductive. Iran stopped complying with the provisions of the JCPOA and resumed the enrichment of uranium. From 2021 to 2024, the administration led by Joe Biden expressed interest in restoring the framework created by the JCPOA or renegotiating it, but eventually this effort failed to produce results. Since the beginning of his second presidential mandate in January 2025, Donald Trump too demonstrated interest in a new Iran nuclear deal. In fact, the president announced the resumption of direct talks with Iran during a meeting with Netanyahu at the White House in April 2025. The Trump administration agreed to negotiate directly with the Iranian government within the framework of a process mediated by Oman, and Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff was scheduled to meet Iran’s Foreign minister Abbas Araghchi in Oman on June 15. The attack on Iran launched by the Israeli government on June 13, however, compromised that effort, and even though Trump claims that a deal is still possible, the situation of military conflict between Israel and Iran clearly makes negotiations more difficult.
Despite the initial success of Israel’s military operations against Iran, there are several reasons to be skeptical about the chances that Operation “Rising Lion” can deliver a long-lasting solution to the conflict between Israel and Iran or successfully prevent the Tehran regime from acquiring a nuclear arsenal. It is in fact possible that the use of force might turn the nightmare scenario of a hostile and nuclear-armed Iran into a self-fulfilling prophecy or generate a major escalation that would involve a direct US intervention in the conflict.
First of all, the attack is unlikely to completely obliterate Iran’s nuclear program. Israel does not have munitions and other assets – such as B-2 bombers – that are strong enough to destroy some of the key underground Iranian nuclear facilities, such as the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. This task could only be accomplished through direct US intervention in support of Israel. Both Israel and Iran appear capable of using their air assets to inflict severe damage on each other – including innocent civilian victims. Israel has one of the most competent and technologically advanced armies in the world, but Iran has a much larger demographic base and one of the largest ballistic missile arsenals in the region – estimates before the conflict ranged between 2,000 and 3,000 – plus other missiles and drones. Neither Israel nor Iran, however, are able to build up a military force capable of crossing the countries that stand between each other and launch a ground offensive to compound the airstrikes. It is quite unlikely but still possible for Israel to bring down the current Iranian leadership through military operations, although it appears that president Trump vetoed the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. It is not clear, however, how even a successful decapitation strategy could give rise to a more friendly government in Tehran, instead of plunging the country into chaos or bringing about an even more radical and aggressive leadership.
The analysis of both past and more recent conflicts in which strategic airpower was a major, or even predominant, component indicates that even an intense and effective strategic air campaign is very unlikely to achieve complete military victory or regime change. In the Battle of Britain, Nazi Germany failed to break British morale or to degrade the UK’s military capabilities. The Allies extensively bombed Nazi Germany but ground operations in the Mediterranean and Northern Europe were necessary to liberate the continent. Even Japan’s decision to surrender in August 1945 was not simply a result of the use of the atomic bomb. In the 1991 Gulf War, the US-led coalition extensively bombed Iraq for several weeks but then a ground offensive was needed to liberate Kuwait – and it took another invasion in 2003 to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein. In 1999, NATO’s air campaign against the Yugoslav Federation eventually persuaded Slobodan Milosevic to relinquish control over Kosovo, but did not bring about regime change. In 2006, Israel launched a major air campaign in Lebanon to disarm and possibly destroy Hezbollah, but that war too failed to achieve the expected results.
Besides the tragic and unnecessary deaths that this conflict is causing, the economic costs are very daunting as well. For example, each Arrow missile – one of the key assets employed by Israel to intercept and destroy incoming Iranian missiles – costs around 3 million dollars. A single battery of the Iron Dome air defense system, costs more than $100 million, and each missile costs $40,000 to 50,000. The outcome of Operation “Rising Lion” thus depends on a number of intertwined economic and military factors such as Israel’s capacity to absorb the damage caused by the Iranian retaliation and resupply its stock of ammunition, as well as the country’s ability to destroy Iranian missile launchers. In general, the technology required to intercept and destroy incoming missiles or drones is much more expensive than the missiles and drones Iran is using to retaliate – although Iran is paying a tremendous human and economic price as well.
Israel can thus slow down the Iranian nuclear program and set it back by a few months or possibly one year, but in the long run the operation could fail to achieve a strategic victory. The attack could also push Iran to withdraw from the NPT and pursue the development of a nuclear arsenal with less scrutiny and more determination. The only possibility to ensure non-proliferation through military means would be to invade Iran, overthrow the Tehran regime, and occupy the country for as long as it is necessary to create a new regime that is more in line with the preferences of the Israeli government. That option too would require a direct American intervention. The historical record strongly suggests, however, that such an operation would likely turn into a bloody and expensive military quagmire. In 2003, the US invaded Iraq and toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein, in part in order to ensure the elimination of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction – although in the aftermath of the invasion it turned out that the allegations that Saddam had an ongoing WMD program were false, as many suspected even before the war. The American occupation lasted 8 years and, at its peak in 2007, the US had more than 170,000 soldiers deployed in the country. Despite such a massive effort, the Iraq War failed to create a stable and reliable Iraq government. Iran has almost double the population of Iraq (around 86 million against 46 million), a territory that is almost four times bigger (1,648,195 km2/636,372 sq mi against 434,934 km2/167,929 sq mi) , and the geography of a natural fortress – with mountain ranges that make and invasion and occupation of the country extremely challenging. In 2001, following the 9/11 attacks, the US invaded Afghanistan, overthrew the Taliban regime, and occupied the country for around 20 years. Between 2010 and 2011 the US deployment in the country reached 100,000 soldiers. That intervention too, however, failed to create a stable and friendly government – and now the Taliban are back in power. Afghanistan was also invaded and occupied by the Soviet Union from 1979 to 1989, and in that case too the USSR failed to achieve any meaningful strategic goal. Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, tried but failed to install a friendly government, and occupied the southern part of the country until 2000. By the time Israeli forces left, Hezbollah had become a major military force and a crucial player in Lebanese politics. Just one month ago, during a major speech in Riyadh, Donald Trump expressed his contempt for the “nation builders” that “wrecked far more nations than they built.”
The war between Israel and Iran is also having significant regional and global repercussions. Israel’s attack led to a spike in oil prices, and the prospect of escalation – including the possibility that the US might get involved – is driving up prices on the world’s energy markets. Several Western governments have declared their support for Israel’s right to defend itself but have expressed concern about the risk of escalation and called for a return to the negotiating table. Middle Eastern governments – including those of the Gulf countries that lavishly hosted Donald Trump last month – have expressed condemnation for Israel’s attacks and solidarity for Iran. In the meantime, the Trump administration is struggling to express a clear US position toward the crisis. Initially, Trump denied US involvement in the attack. Then, as noted, the president reportedly expressed opposition to Netanyahu’s plan to try to assassinate Khamenei. Recently, however, the president has stated that “It’s possible we could get involved” and has called for Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” while the US is further increasing its military presence in the region. The analysis of the already tragic consequences of the war as well as the potential economic and geopolitical consequences of the conflict, strongly suggests that the most reasonable approach is to urge restraint and do anything possible to cease military operations and resume negotiations toward a new Iran nuclear deal. Negotiations have proved to be the only effective way to neutralize the threat of a nuclear Iran. Reason, however, is not the only factor shaping war. As famously observed by Carl von Clausewitz, chance and passion are equally important components in the unfolding of a military conflict. “War is an act of force,” Clausewitz famously wrote, “and there is no logical limit to the application of that force.” There is still a hope that, if the war can be brought to an end, a weakened Iran will be more inclined to negotiate and make concessions, such as agreeing again to acquire enriched uranium from foreign suppliers. Even in that case, however, an effective and enduring deal will require credible guarantees to the Iranians that neither the US nor Israel will try again to overthrow the Tehran regime. With Operation “Rising Lion”, the Netanyahu government crossed the Rubicon. Restoring order has become extremely more difficult.
Diego Pagliarulo