Since Donald Trump’s second inauguration in January 2025, the Middle East has been the defining foreign policy issue of his administration. The region has become the most prominent testing ground for the president’s worldview and global strategy, while dealing with the turbulent geopolitics of the Middle East has virtually monopolized the attention of Trump and his key advisers. US policy toward the region, however, has also exposed some contradictions and dilemmas that have not yet been fully clarified or addressed by Trump and his team. Major initiatives such as Trump’s tour of the Gulf States, the administration’s approach to the war in Gaza, and the reaction to the war between Israel and Iran, demonstrate the struggle to devise a consistent and sustainable approach toward the region.
Trump’s tour of the Persian Gulf States generated interest, entertainment, and some controversy. Trump embarked on a high profile 4-day state visit that started in Saudi Arabia on May 13, continued in Qatar, and ended in the United Arab Emirates on May 16. Several highlights of this trip had a strong impact on the news cycle, although an effort to assess the real short and long-term implications of these initiatives paints a mixed picture.
The most controversial part of the visit was the donation by the Qatari government of a $400 million Boeing 747 “flying palace” that Trump intends to use as a replacement of the Air Force One presidential plane and eventually feature in his presidential library. This extremely expensive gift starkly contrasts with the “Emoluments Clause” of the US Constitution, and it is estimated that adapting the luxury jet to the security requirements of the US presidency will take years and exact significant costs that will be covered by American taxpayers.
The trip was also an opportunity for Trump to reiterate his transactional vision of foreign policy and his skepticism concerning American intervention in the region. In a major speech in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Trump praised “a new generation of leaders” that is “forging a future where the Middle East is defined by commerce, not chaos”, lauded “the gleaming marvels of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi” and expressed contempt for the “nation builders” that “wrecked far more nations than they built.”
Trump’s visit was also defined by a series of high-profile meetings and trade and security deals. Trump claimed to have secured deals worth more than 2 trillion dollars for the US. The fact sheets released by the White House mention a $600 billion Saudi commitment to invest in the US, a deal between America and Qatar worth $243 billion as well as an additional agreement with the Doha government that is expected to generate $1.2 trillion, and commercial deals with the UAE for $200 billion plus an Emirati commitment to invest $1.4 trillion in the US in the next ten years. The US delegation featured CEOs from America’s most prominent corporations – including Elon Musk, who until recently also led the Trump administration’s Department of Government Efficiency but is now becoming an outspoken critic of the president. Investment in technology and AI was a major component of the trade deals signed during Trump’s visits. In particular, the deals signed between the US and the UAE include a commitment to invest in the American tech sector as well as the plan to open the largest AI campus outside the US in Abu Dhabi. Defense was another major component of the dealmaking that took place during Trump’s tour. The Saudi government signed an arms deal worth $142 billion that includes – among other things – aircraft, air and missile defense systems. The deals with Qatar, moreover, feature substantial investments in military equipment as well as burden sharing concerning the al-Udeid air base – America’s largest military facility in the region.
Trump’s tour of the Gulf states was thus marked by several major announcements that appear intended to cement his administration’s interest in strengthening security and economic relations with the region’s energy rich Arab monarchies. At the same time, the presidential visit was notable for other momentous developments that signal a potentially significant remodulation of US policy in the area. In Riyadh, Trump announced that the US would lift sanctions on Syria and then met the country’s new leader – Ahmed al-Sharaa. The governments of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, for their part, pledged to pay off Syria’s $15.5 million debt to the World Bank, thus making the Damascus government newly eligible for grants. This decision is particularly relevant in relation to other policies recently instituted by the Trump administration, such as a ceasefire with the Houthis – a pro-Iranian Yemeni militia that has carried out military strikes in the Red Sea and against Israel since the beginning of the war in Gaza – and the resumption of negotiations with the Tehran regime on the Iranian nuclear program. Interestingly, these developments – along with negotiations between Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff and Hamas – happened against the wishes of the Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu, and Trump bypassed Israel on his way to the Gulf states.
Both the style of Trump’s visit and the number of deals announced during the trip suggested a major shift in Washington’s policy toward the Middle East. However, when the outcome of Trump’s tour is put in perspective and US intervention in support of Israel’s military operations against Iran is factored in, the game-changing nature of these initiatives appears more limited, while it is open to question whether the administration’s vision is actually sustainable.
First of all, it is important to observe that some of the numbers associated with the deals refer to expectations and commitments that will be gradually implemented over several years. As noted in the press release concerning the US-Saudi deal, the rationale of the agreement is to build “economic ties that will endure for generations to come.” Given the long-term nature of these commitments, it is reasonable to expect that at least some of the agreements will be updated and renegotiated by future leaders, while some investments may generate smaller actual returns than expected. The Gulf monarchies are investing very significant amounts of money in the modernization of their economies and in futuristic infrastructure projects. However, the historical record suggests that similar modernization projects attempted in the past have generated relatively limited results. Trump’s visit, moreover, was also notable for some of the commitments that were not taken. Saudi Arabia has been demanding a stronger US engagement to defend the kingdom – an obligation comparable to article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty – as well as assistance in the development of a nuclear program. These demands, however, proved beyond what Trump was prepared to discuss in May.
Second, some of the agreements announced during Trump’s visit, particularly those concerning arms sales and security cooperation, may interfere with the president’s anti-interventionist attitude toward the Middle East. The Gulf states are already among the world’s largest importers of weapons and military equipment – and the US is by far the most important supplier. According to the estimates of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, moreover, in 2024 Saudi Arabia was the world’s 7th largest military spender. Despite this very important investment in defense capabilities the Gulf states remain dependent on American assistance, military presence, and direct intervention to guarantee their security. In recent years, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE have also become more proactive military actors. Their interventions in areas such as Yemen, Libya, and the Horn of Africa, however, have proven expensive and inconclusive, while the humanitarian consequences have been profoundly negative. An increase in US arms sales to the Gulf states without an effort to rethink the Middle East’s security architecture may thus increase the risk of instability and conflict, with the paradoxical consequence of keeping the United States deeply involved in the region.
Trump’s anti-interventionist instincts were also contradicted by America’s direct involvement in Israel’s war against Iran. During the night of June 21-22, the US launched Operation Midnight Hammer, a massive airstrike involving stealth B-2 bombers and “bunker buster” ammunition against key Iranian nuclear sites such as Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow. The US attack made it possible to severely damage targets that were beyond the reach of the Israeli military, although it is not clear to what extent the Tehran regime’s nuclear program was set back by the operation. Trump shifted position several times throughout the 12-day conflict that was started by Israel’s attack on Iran on June 13. At first, the president declared that the US had nothing to do with the attack, then he claimed that the US had “complete and total control of the skies over Iran,” and later invoked “Regime change.” In the event, as he announced the ceasefire – which had been brokered by the US and Qatar – Trump congratulated both Israel and Iran “on having the Stamina, Courage, and Intelligence to end” the war.
The “12-Day War” – as Trump called it – also suggests that the divergence between the Trump administration and the Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu might be much less substantial or abnormal than perceived. When it comes to the Middle East, several of Trump’s key foreign policy and national security advisors share the right-wing vision and the hawkish geopolitical outlook promoted by the current Israeli government. Netanyahu has visited the US three times since Trump came back to power. The most recent visit took place in Washington on July 7. The two leaders discussed the recent intervention against Iran as well as the future of Gaza. Moreover, as noted by Aluf Benn, historically, US grand strategy in the Middle East has never been perfectly aligned with Israel’s wishes. In this respect, Trump’s first mandate (2017-2021) and Joe Biden’s presidency (2021-2025) were outstanding for their virtually unconditional political, economic, and military support for Israel’s Middle East vision. Where Israel has consistently received a free hand from Washington, according to Benn, is with regard to the peace process with the Palestinians. Since taking office, on the one hand Trump has repeatedly and proactively called for a ceasefire in Gaza. On the other and, he has revoked sanctions against Israeli settlers, sanctioned the International Criminal Court in retaliation to the Court’s arrest warrants against Netanyahu and former Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant (along with some now defunct Hamas leaders), and expressed support for the idea of turning the Gaza Strip into a “Riviera,” even if that would mean relocating the Palestinian population of the area – a plan that is clearly not endorsed by the population of Gaza, by the Palestinians more broadly, or by the Arab public opinion as well as the governments of America’s Middle Eastern partners. In this respect Trump’s tour of the Gulf States and tentative negotiations with Iran may in fact have signaled a return to that long term trend, rather than a revolution. Operation Midnight Hammer and direct US involvement in Israel’s military intervention against Iran, however, suggest that Trump’s approach is in fact even more in continuity with his first mandate and the policy of Joe Biden than it had appeared just a few weeks before the Israel-Iran war. In the meantime, the government of Benjamin Netanyahu is continuing military operations in Gaza and remains vehemently opposed to the idea of Palestinian statehood.
Finally, it is not yet clear whether the Trump administration’s most recent policy initiatives are part of a long term plan to rethink the United States’ strategy in the region and address the dilemmas that have affected America’s role in the Middle East. Both the first Trump presidency and the Biden administration invested significant political capital in the effort to create a more integrated Middle East and favor the rapprochement between Israel and its Arab neighbors, particularly Saudi Arabia. This was the logic of the “Abraham Accords” process initiated under the Trump administration in the summer of 2020 and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor initiative launched by the Biden administration in 2023. Such an approach, however, faces a number of structural obstacles that are becoming increasingly evident.
In spite of the long standing relationship that exists between the US and Saudi Arabia – a partnership famously cemented by the February 1945 meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud on the USS Quincy – American and Saudi interests currently show serious differences. The most serious issue is the price of oil. President Trump has clearly expressed a preference for low oil prices. In contrast, Riyadh has a strong interest in high oil prices. Energy is still by far the most important pillar of the Saudi economy, and the country’s breakeven oil price is rising – according to the IMF, the Saudi government needs an oil price of at least $90 a barrel to balance the budget. The price of oil, however, has seen a significant decline: crude oil prices dropped from $80 a barrel in January to $60 in May. The war between Israel and Iran led to a temporary rise in oil prices, but that spike disappeared soon after the ceasefire. This trend means that Saudi Arabia and other oil producing Persian Gulf monarchies are facing the problem of growing budget deficits. High oil prices are thus vital to the success of Saudi Arabia’s modernization projects as well as for the internal social and political stability of the kingdom.
The Netanyahu government’s reaction to the October 7 terrorist attacks carried out by Hamas against Israel, moreover, is making the continuation of the process initiated by the Abraham accords – particularly the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia – much more unlikely. The Israeli military intervention in Gaza has been particularly indiscriminate and has generated a humanitarian catastrophe. In addition – as already mentioned – Netanyahu and key members of his cabinet have manifested a strong aversion to the idea of a Palestinian state. This situation means that a resumption of meaningful talks between Saudi Arabia and Israel are – at least temporarily – out of question. Moreover, some of Saudi Arabia’s flagship modernization projects – such as Noem and “The Line” – are located in the kingdom’s Tabuk province, close to southern Israel and the Gaza Strip. Hence, a continuation of hostilities in the area represents a direct economic and geopolitical concern for the government in Riyadh. As a matter of fact, it appears that the Gulf states increasingly see Israel as a disruptor of regional order, and are becoming supportive of a US-Iran nuclear deal. Israel’s strikes against Iran, as well as US intervention in support of Israel, have probably slowed down the Tehran regime’s nuclear program, but may have made the chances of achieving an effective and enduring nuclear deal much more difficult.
Since his return to the White House, Donald Trump has adopted a bold and – for better and for worse – peculiar approach towards the Middle East. The president has been much less interested in promoting America’s liberal vision and support for human rights and more inclined to see the region through the prism of his transactional and anti-interventionist vision. At the same time, Trump has been particularly vocal in expressing his preference for a quick end to the war in Gaza and has been ready to diverge from the policies advocated by the Netanyahu government on crucial issues such as Syria, the Houthis, and the prospect of negotiations concerning the Iranian nuclear dossier. Trump’s tour of the Gulf states, his call for an end of the war in Gaza, and the resumption of negotiations with Iran appeared to be steps in the direction of a major rethinking of American policy toward the Middle East. These initiatives, however, were overshadowed by many other policies adopted by the Trump administration, and potentially shattered by Washington’s management of the Israel-Iran crisis. As tension and conflicts continue to torment the Middle East, it is not yet clear whether the Trump administration has a consistent plan to successfully resolve dilemmas that are shaping Washington’s policy in the region and devise a path forward.
Diego Pagliarulo